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This study investigated the CEO Compensation system of the Canadian Financial 
Institutions. It attested the relationship between the CEO Compensation, the Firm Size, the 
Firm Performance, and the CEO Power, in the TSX/S&P index companies from the period 
2005 to the period 2010. The totalled of the eighteen largest Canadian financial companies 
were selected through the random sampling method from the TSX/S&P index. The research 
question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation, the 
Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power? To answer this question, six 
statistical models were created and accordingly six attestations were performed. It was 
found that, there was a relationship between the CEO Salary, the Firm Size, the Firm 
Performance, and the CEO Power; there was a relationship between the CEO Bonus and the 
CEO Power; and there was a relationship between the CEO Total Compensation and the 
Firm Size and Firm Performance. However, it was found that there was no relationship 
between the CEO Bonus, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance. In addition, it was found 
that there was no relationship between the CEO Total Compensation and the CEO Power. 
The correlation between the CEO Cash Salary, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance 
was positively good to strong ratios; the correlation between the CEO Salary and the CEO 
Power was negatively weak ratio; and the correlation between the CEO Bonus, the Firm 
Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power was positively weak. 
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The purpose of this research is to understand in-depth the Canadian financial 
institutions CEO Cash Compensation system. In addition, over the past decade in 
Canada, the Canadian public had raised concerns over the huge bonuses declared to 
the CEOs by their board of directors. The failure to understand the determinants of 
the CEO cash compensation by the public had leaded to blaming the CEOs of rent 
grabbing; misused of its power towards board; and its monopolization of the 
compensation system.  Thus, these ever growing concerns bring to the foreground 
conclusion the need to further study in depth, at least one of the major industries in 
the Canada, the financial institutions, the primary relationship and the resulting 
dynamics between the CEO Cash Compensation, the Firm Size, the Firm 
Performance, and the CEO Power.  
 
The CEOs and the other executives would like to eliminate the risk exposure in their 
compensation packages by decoupling their pay from performance and linking it to a 
more stable factor, the Firm Size. This strategy indeed deviates from obtaining the 
optimum results from the principal-agent contracting. The past studies had found a 
strong relationship between the CEO Compensation and the Firm Size but the 
correlations results were ranged from the nil to the strong positive, among the large 
company’s studies. The variables used in the past studies as a proxy for the Firm 
Size were the Total Sales, the Total Number of Employees, or the Total Assets. 
Therefore, the Firm Size needs to be studied with the CEO Cash Compensation on 
an extensive basis such as: using both the Total Sales and the Total Number of 
Employees.  
 
The most researched topic in the executive compensation is between the CEO 
Compensation and the Firm Performance. Although the executive compensation and 
the firm performance had been the subject of debate amongst the academic, there 
was little consensus on the precise nature of the relationship as such, further 
researched in greater detail need to be conducted to understand in the finer terms the 
true extent of the relationship between them. As such, this research had 
unprecedentedly used eight variables to attest with the CEO Cash Compensation, 
that is, the Return on Assets (ROA), the Return on Equity (ROE), the Earnings per 
Share (EPS), the Cash Flow per Share (CFPS), the Net Profit Margin (NPM), the 
Book Value per Common Shares Outstanding (BVCSO), and the Market Value per 
Common Shares Outstanding (MVCSO).  
 
The relationship between the CEO compensation and the CEO power was not 
attested extensively in the past, especially in Canada. In fact, only few credible 
researched papers were available for to study. That is, the CEO power only has been 
the subject of the recent focus among the researchers, primarily due to the effect of 
the researchers failed to find the strong relationship between the CEO 
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Compensation, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance. The variables used in the 
past studies as a proxy for the CEO Power such as, the CEO Age; the CEO Tenure; 
and the CEO Tenure, were found to have the weak to the negligible relationship 
with the CEO Compensation. In addition, the third party data collection, the lower 
quality of the sampling population focus such as at the industry level, and the use of 
different statistical methods, all had leaded to the divergency in the results. 
Therefore, the CEO Power needs to be studied with the CEO Cash Compensation on 
an extensive basis such as using, the CEO Age, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the 
CEO Share Value, the CEO Tenure, the CEO Turnover, the Management 5 percent 
ownership, and the Individuals/Institutions 5 percent ownership.  
 
2.  Literature review 
 
2.1  CEO Cash Compensation and Firm Size 
Gomez-Mejia and Barkema (1998) defined the relationship between CEO Cash 
Compensation and Firm Size as: A positive relationship between the CEO 
compensation and the firm performance would be consistent with the agency theory, 
the dominant paradigm in this stream of research. The CEOs cash incentives have a 
strong relationship with the firm size as the CEOs in larger companies make higher 
income than the CEOs in the smaller companies. This is supported by Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1996) that the firm size is related to the level of executive 
compensation. According to Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1994) the measurement of the 
firm size was the composite score of the standardized values of reported the total 
sales and the number of employees. Shafer (1998) showed that the pay sensitivity 
(measured as the dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar change in firm value) falls 
with the square root of the firm size. That is, the CEO incentives are 10 times higher 
for a $10 billion firm than for a $100 million firm.  
 
From the famous meta-analysis conducted by Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia 
(2000) they found that the estimated correlation between the CEO pay and the 
aggregate firm size factor is .643, signifying that the firm size accounts for over 40% 
of the variance in CEO pay. Similarly, the adjusted composite correlation between 
the change in the CEO pay and the change in the Firm Size is .225, accounting for 
about 5% of the variance in changes in the CEO pay. In addition, they found that the 
CEOs can exert more influence over the Firm Size than the CEO Performance, and 
therefore, they would prefer to use the firm size as the criterion for the compensation 
purposes. Firstly, this is supported by Simmons, & Wright (1990) that the CEO pay 
increases considerably following a major acquisition even when the firm 
performance suffers. Secondly, Kostiuk (1990) argued that the greater the size may 
be used to legitimize the higher CEO pays by appealing to rationalizations to justify 
a size premium. Rationalizations may include: the greater organizational 
complexity; and more CEO human capital required to run the business (Agarwal, 
1981). Thirdly, executives are risk averse. They can reduce or eliminate risk 
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exposure in their compensation package by decoupling their pay from performance 
and linking it to a more stable factor, the firm size (Dyl, 1988; and McEachern, 
1975). In addition, according to Gomez-Mejia (1994) a host of structural factors and 
the pragmatic problems make it difficult for the corporations to effectively control 
executives, leading to the compensation packages that are more closely tied to the 
firm size than the performance. According to Sigler (2011) the firm size appears to 
be the most significant factor in determining the level of the total CEO 
compensation. His examination was based on the 280 firms listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2009. 
 
There was substantial evidence that the firm size was a major determinant of the 
CEO pay Fox (1983). Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) believed that the bigger 
firms tend to pay more because the CEO oversees substantial resources, rather than 
because of their number of hierarchical pay levels. This theory was explained in 
other form by Fox (1983) that the CEOs are paid more in the larger firms primarily 
due to its leadership demand and more hierarchical layers exist in the larger firms. 
However, the results have varied from nil to strongly positive associations between 
the CEO compensation and the larger firms (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989).  
 
Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987) believed that the firm size was a less risky 
basis for setting executives’ pay than performance, which was subject to many 
uncontrollable forces outside the managerial sphere of influence. Similarly, 
McEachern (1975) argued that the CEOs in management-controlled firms will prefer 
to avoid the risk of tying pay to the performance, therefore, the firm size, which was 
likely to vary less than performance, will most affect pay. This was supported by 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) and Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin (1987) that 
the firm size was related to the total pay in the management-controlled firms but not 
the owner-controlled firms suggesting that the managerial control was a moderator 
of the pay-size relationship. In the owner-controlled firms, the large share of 
compensation should be contingent on the firm performance than was base salary 
(Gomez-Mezia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987). Murphy (1985) showed that the holding 
the value of a firm constant, a firm whose sales grow by 10 percent will increase the 
salary and bonus of its CEO by between 2 percent and 3 percent. These findings 
suggested that the size-pay relation is causal.  It also suggests that CEOs can 
increase their pay by increasing the firm-size, even when the increase in size reduces 
the firm’s market value. Prasad (1974) believed that executive salaries appear to be 
far more closely correlated with the scale of operations of the firm than its 
profitability. He also believed that the executive compensation was primarily a 
reward for the past sales performance and was not necessarily an incentive for future 
sales efforts. 
 
Tosi et al. (2000) believed that the most of the studies conducted by scholars found 
that the executive pay as a control mechanism are remarkably inconsistent not only 
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with the theory but with each other. This is supported by studies conducted by 
Belkaoui and Picur (1993), David, Koachhar, and Levitas (1998), and Gray and 
Cannella (1997) that the correlations between the firm size and the CEO pay are as 
low as .107, .110, and .170, while studies conducted by Boyd (1994), and 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) reported correlations of .62, .50, and .42.  
 
2.2  CEO Cash Compensation and Firm Performance linkage  
The CEO cash compensation is generally believed to be weakly related to the firm 
performance, according to a majority of studies conducted in the United States and 
the UK. It is believed that the CEO power and weaker governance plays an 
important role in the weak relationship between the CEO cash compensation and the 
firm performance. Henderson and Fredrickson (1996) stated that while the CEO 
total pay may be unrelated to performance, it is related to the organizational 
complexity that they manage. Likewise, other similar studies conducted by Murphy 
(1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Joskow and Rose (1994) and Thalassinos, 
Havlíček and Berezkinova (2012) for SMEs, supported this nature of the 
relationship.  
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that incentive alignment as an explanatory agency 
construct for the CEO pay is weakly supported at best. That is, objective provisions 
of principal-agent contract cannot be comprehensive enough to effectively create a 
strong direct CEO pay and performance relationship. They found that the pay 
performance sensitivity for the executives is approximately $3.25 per $1000 change 
in the shareholder wealth, the “small for an occupation in which the incentive pay is 
expected to play an important role”. This is supported by legendary work of Tosi, 
Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) on pay studies in the form of the meta-
analysis that the overall ratio of the change in the CEO pay and change in the 
financial performance is 0.203, an accounting for about 4% of the variance. The 
estimated true correlation between the CEO pay and the Return on Equity is .212. 
And the estimated true correlation between the CEO pay and the Total Assets is 
0.117. Thus, these other financial measures account for less than the 2% of the 
variance in the CEO pay levels. This weak relationship is explained by Borman and 
Motowidlo (1993) and Rosen (1990) who stated that the archival performance data 
focuses only on a small portion of the CEO’s job performance requirements and 
therefore it is difficult to form an overall conclusion.  
 
According to Jensen and Murphy (1990) it is possible that the CEO bonuses are 
strongly tied to an unexamined or unobservable measure of the performance. If the 
bonuses depend on the performance measures observable only to the board of 
directors and are highly variable, they could provide a significant incentives. One 
way to detect the existence of such “phantom” performance measures is to examine 
the magnitude of year-to-year fluctuations in the CEO compensation. The large 
swings in the CEO pay from year to year were consistent with the existence of an 
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overlooked but important performance measure: small annual changes in the CEO 
pay suggested that the CEO pay was essentially unrelated to all the relevant 
performance measures. Furthermore, they argued that although bonuses represent 
50% of the CEO salary, such bonuses were awarded in ways that were not highly 
sensitive to performance as measured by changes in the market value of the equity, 
the accounting earnings, or the sales. In addition, they found that, that while more of 
the variation in the CEO pay could be explained by the changes in the accounting 
profits than the stock market value, however, the pay-performance sensitivity 
remains insignificant. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) found in their studies that the CEO received an average 
pay increase of $31,700 in years when the shareholders earned the zero return, and 
received on average an additional 1.35¢ per $1,000 increase in the shareholder’s 
wealth. These estimates are comparable to those of Murphy (1985 and 1986), 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) who found pay-
performance elasticity of approximately 0.1 – the salaries and the bonuses increased 
by about one percent for every ten percent rise in the value of the firm. Additionally, 
they stated that the average pay increase for the CEO whose shareholders gain $400 
million was $37,300, compared to an average pay increase of $26,500 for the CEO 
whose shareholders lose $400 million. Their Forbes study was based on the 
Executive Compensation Surveys covered from the period 1974 to1986. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) provided one explanation for the small pay-performance sensitivity 
was that, the boards have fairly good information regarding the managerial activity 
and therefore the weight on output was small relative to the weight on input. 
 
On the other hand, Jensen and Zimmerman (1985) argued that the evidence was 
inconsistent with the view that executive compensation is unrelated to the firm 
performance and that the executive compensation plans enrich managers at the 
expense of shareholders. This argument was supported by Mehran (1995) reported 
that the CEO pay structure was positively related to same-year performance. In 
addition, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) also found in their studies that the CEO 
salaries and the bonuses were positively and significantly related to the firm 
performance as measured by the rate of return on common stock. That is, CEO pay 
changes by about 1.6% for each 10% return on the common stock. In addition, they 
found that the CEO cash compensation was positively related to the firm 
performance and negatively related to the industry performance, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, Antle and Smith (1986) found no relation between the salary and the 
bonus and the industry returns. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) and 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argued that there was an evidence that CEO cash 
compensation increases when firm profits rise for reasons that clearly have nothing 
to do with managers’ efforts.  
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Murphy (1985) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) found a significant relationship 
between the level of pay (measured by changes in executive wealth) and the 
performance (measured by changes in firm value). At the same time, Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) argued that the failure to include the cash performance measure in 
the pay-performance studies may thus create the impression that the management 
compensation was unresponsive to the corporate performance. Similarly, Iyengar 
(2000) found that on the average, the level of the CEO cash compensation was 
positively related to the firms’ level of the operating cash flows. On the other hand, 
Carpenter and Sanders (2002) argued that the CEO’s total pay may be unrelated to 
the performance, but it may relate to the organizational complexity that they 
manage. This argument was supported by Jensen and Murphy (1989) as he provided 
additional hypothesis in the form of political forces factor in the contracting process 
which implicitly regulate executive compensation by constraining the type of the 
contracts that can be written between the management and the shareholders. These 
political forces, operating in both the political sector and within organizations, 
appear to be important but were difficult to document because they operate in 
informal and indirect ways. The public disapproval of high rewards seems to have 
truncated the upper tail of the earnings distribution of the corporate executives. The 
equilibrium in the managerial labour market then prohibits the large penalties for the 
poor performance and as a result the dependence of pay on performance was 
decreased. Their findings that, the pay-performance relation; the raw variability of 
the pay changes; and the inflation-adjusted pay levels, have declined substantially 
since the1930s, was consistent with such implicit regulation. 
 
Mehran (1995) found that the companies in which the CEO compensation was 
relatively sensitive to the firm performance tend to produce the higher returns for the 
shareholders than the companies in which the relationship between the CEO pay and 
the performance was weak. Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) found in 
their empirical studies that there was a positive relation between the CEO 
compensation and the stock returns. Jensen and Murphy (1990) believed that the 
cash compensation should be structured to provide big rewards for the outstanding 
performance and the meaningful penalties for the poor performance. Also, they 
believed that weak link between the CEO cash compensation and the corporate 
performance would be less troubling if the CEOs owned a large percentage of 
corporate equity. 
 
According to McEachern (1975), Allen (1981), Amould (1985), Gomez-Mejia, Tosi, 
and Hinkin (1987), Dyl (1988), Gomez-Mejia and Tosi (1989), Kroll, Simmons, and 
Wright (1989), the relationship between the executive pay and the performance may 
be stronger in the owner-controlled than in the management-controlled firms. 
Werner and Tosi (1995) showed that the managers in widely held firms are paid 
more than the managers in the closely held firms through the higher salaries, the 
higher bonuses, and the higher long-term incentives. Dyl (1988) argued that that 
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there is a downside hedge in the pay of CEOs in management-controlled firms, 
given that it is more strongly related to the firm size, not the performance. He also 
believed that, the owner-controlled firms will seek to transfer some of the risks 
borne to the managers, and this should be reflected in their compensation policies 
(Antle and Smith, 1986).  
 
2.3  CEO Cash Compensation and CEO Power  
It is believed that the CEO in the larger firms tend to own less stock and have less 
compensation-based incentives than the CEOs in the smaller firms. This is supported 
by Jensen and Murphy (1985) by stating that our all-inclusive estimate of the pay-
performance sensitivity for the CEOs in the firms in the top half of our sample 
(ranked by market value) is $1.85 per $1,000, compared to $8.05 per $1,000 for the 
CEOs in the firms in the bottom half of our sample. In addition, they (1990) argued 
that as a percentage of the total corporate value, the CEO share ownership had never 
been very high. The median CEO of one of the nation’s 250 largest public 
companies own shares worth just over $2.4 million – again, less than 0.07% of the 
company’s market value. Also, 9 out of 10 CEO own less than 1% of their 
company’s stock, while less than 1 in 20 owns more than 5% of the company’s 
outstanding shares. Jensen and Murphy (1990) found in their study that the most 
powerful link between the shareholder wealth and the executive wealth was direct 
ownership of the shares by the CEO. They found, on average, the CEOs receive 
about 50% of their base pay in the form of the bonuses. They argued that most 
experts assessed the CEO stock ownership in terms of the dollar value of the CEO’s 
holdings or the value of his shares as a percentage of his annual cash compensation. 
However, they also argued that neither of these measures was relevant in the CEO 
incentive determination. They believed that the percentage of the company’s 
outstanding shares of the CEO ownership influences the CEO’s pay. However, their 
statistical analysis found no correlation between the CEO stock ownership and pay-
for-performance sensitivity in cash compensation. That is, the board of directors 
ignore the CEO stock ownership when structuring incentive plans. This is supported 
by Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) study who found a negative correlation between 
the equity ownership of the largest shareholder and the amount of the CEO 
compensation: doubling the percentage ownership of the outside shareholder 
reduces the non-salary compensation by 12-14 percent. This was supported to the 
great extent by Murphy and Jensen (1990) who found in their study that there was a 
small and insignificant positive coefficient of the ownership-interaction variable 
exist, which implied that the relation between compensation and performance was 
independent of an executive’s stock holdings. The result that the pay-performance 
relation was not affected by stock ownership seems inconsistent with the agency 
theory since the optimal compensation contracts that provide incentives for 
managers to create shareholder wealth will not be independent of their 
shareholdings. Their study findings were based on the sampling of the 73 
manufacturing firms for the 15 years period. Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) also 
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argued that the CEO pay is negatively related to the share ownership of the board’s 
compensation committee; and doubling compensation committee ownership reduces 
non-salary compensation by 4-5 percent. In addition, many other studies also failed 
to find any relationship between the firm value and the executives’ equity stakes 
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga 
2001; Zampeta 2012), primarily due to the equity holdings were the decision of the 
managers and the boards, none of these correlations can be interpreted as causal. 
However, these findings were challenged by Mehran (1995) who found a positive 
relationship between the percentage of total compensation in cash (salary and bonus) 
and the percentage of shares held by managers. This was supported by Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) found in their study that changes in both the CEO’s pay-related 
wealth and the value of his stock holdings were positively and statistically related to 
the changes in the shareholder’s wealth, and the CEO turnover probabilities were 
negatively and significantly related to changes in shareholder wealth. Ungson and 
Steers (1984) believed that in the firms where the CEO had large shareholdings, 
long tenure, control of the top management team, or other means, the CEO can 
largely shape his or her pay. Similarly, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1988) believed 
that the relative power of the CEO may affect the height of the hurdles that are set to 
qualify for the contingent pay. In addition, they also believed that the executives 
who own the significant portions of their firms are likely to control not only the 
operating decisions but the board decisions as well. As such, the executives would 
be in a position to essentially set their own compensation. In addition, they believed 
that the stronger the family’s position in the firm, the stronger will be the 
executive’s position, despite the family shareholders may not be as active as the 
independent directors might be. They also found that the CEO compensation and 
shareholdings are related in an inverted-U manner, with the compensation highest in 
situations of moderate the CEO ownership. That is, the point of inflection happened 
when the CEO shareholdings reached about the 9 percent. Up to that point, increases 
in the CEO ownership seemed to bring increased salaries, due to increase in the 
CEO Power and the CEO Tenure for the first 18 years, and beyond that ownership 
level, the salaries dropped, due to tax preference of incurring the capital gains over 
the current income.  
 
Jensen and Murphy (1989) found that the executive inside-stock ownership can 
provide incentives, but these holdings are not generally controlled by the corporate 
board, and the majority of the top executives have the small personal equity 
ownership. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) found that the CEOs in the firms that 
lack a 5 percent (or larger) external shareholder tend to receive more luck-based pay 
-pay associated with the profit increases that are entirely generated by the external 
factors rather than by managers’ efforts. They also found that in the firms lacking 
large external shareholders, the cash compensation of CEOs is reduced less when 
their option-based compensation is increased.  
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Murphy (1986) argued that the CEO tenure had shown to influence the CEO 
performance pay in prior research. The increased CEO tenure may promote a 
principal’s trust of an agent and the assumption that actions will be taken in the 
principal’s interest. Sigler (2011) argued that the CEO tenure appears to be one of 
the significant variables in determining the level of the CEO compensation. His 
examination was based on the 280 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange for 
a period from 2006 to 2009.     
 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) believed that the CEO tenure was thought to have 
a positive link with the compensation, with pay steadily increasing as the CEO gains 
and solidifies the power over-time. However, in their findings such a pattern was not 
observed for any of the measures of the CEO compensation. Since a monotonic 
relationship was not found between the CEO tenure and the CEO pay, the existence 
of a curvilinear association was investigated. In addition, the average tenure of the 
CEOs was significantly lower in the externally-controlled firms (2.96 years) than the 
management-controlled firms (5.92 years). Thus, they believed that the boards of the 
externally-controlled firms may not need to pay from the profitability because the 
CEO tenure was dependent on the owner’s satisfaction with the CEO performance. 
For the total pay, this finding was relatively strong with the inflation adjusted pay 
starting to decline at about 18 years of tenure.  According to them there were two 
possible explanations for this curvilinear pattern. The first was that the power 
accrues for a while and then diminishes due to the CEO’s reduced mobility in the 
managerial labor market, or due to his evolution into a figurehead with one or two 
younger high priced executives who carry the actual weight of the CEO’s job. The 
second possibility was that executive reach a point where they prefer other forms of 
the compensation over the current cash. This could occur because of the changes in 
the family and the financial circumstances, or due to a switch to reliance on the 
stock appreciation and dividends, as the CEO’s shareholdings increase over-time. 
This supposition was supported when the two subsamples were examined (p < 0.01) 
greater shareholdings than a short-tenure low-pay group. Hence, it was not that 
longer-tenured CEOs are paid less, but rather that the pay mix shifts from the cash to 
the stock earnings over-time, supporting the notion that personal circumstances 
influence pay. They also argued that the longer the CEO’s tenure, the more the 
board will consist of his or her own, often sympathetic appointees. In addition, the 
management-controlled firms where the CEOs were relatively powerful, CEO tenure 
was likely to be important to pay determinants. Despite their detailed findings their 
study was inconclusive as they failed to derive strong expected correlations among 
the variables due to the small sample-sized sampling which had affected the results 
not being representative of the larger population. However, Pfeffer (1981) supported 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) findings and believed that the creation of a 
personal mystique which may induce unquestioned deference or loyalty can be 
expected to occur when the CEO power becomes institutionalized in the 
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organization. A second source of power that is expected to affect compensation is 
the executive’s shareholdings in the firm.  
 
Deckop (1988) argued that the CEO’s age had little effect on the CEO 
compensation. However, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1998) found an inverted U-
shaped relationship between the CEO age and the CEO cash compensation. The 
cash compensation increased with an age up to a point at 59 years, beyond which 
real cash earnings decreased. They also believed that this pattern of the earnings 
over-time is in line with the CEO’s need for cash, which tends to drop off as he or 
she gets older due to no major expenditures to incur such as house and child-rearing 
expenses 
 
3.  Research methodology 
 
This research had adopted the quantitative research method as it is the method to be 
used for the historical data collection and the descriptive studies. The longitudinal 
study approach had been selected under the quantitative research methodology to 
study the corporate financial records from 2005 to 2010. The stratified sampling 
method had been selected to obtain the total sampling population of the eighteen 
companies for this research from the TSX/S&P index.  
 
For the statistical tests, the CEO Cash Compensation was assigned as the dependent 
variable; the Firm Size was assigned as the control variable and the independent 
variable; and the CEO Performance and the CEO Power had been assigned as 
independent variables. Each sub-variables of the CEO Cash Compensation had been 
used separately to attest with all the sub-independent variables of the Firm Size, the 
Firm Performance, and the CEO Power. The total of the six models were created and 
accordingly attest each of them to address the research question. 
 
The survey method had been adopted as it is the most appropriate approach to 
collect the historical data. The historical data of the sampled companies had been 
obtained from the TMX Group Inc. and the CDS Inc. The Inferential statistics-based 
methodology, which is very instrumental to this quantitative research, had been used 
to obtain statistical results. The 95 percent confidence level will be assumed for all 
the research attestations. 
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4.  Data Findings 
 
4.1 CEO Compensation System  
 
Table 1: Regression Analysis (ANOVA) 
 
 Salary Bonus Total Compensation 
F(2,105)=47.34 F(2,105)=0.025 F(2,236)=25.510 
p=.000 p=.976 p=.000  Firm Size 
R2=0.474 R2=0.000 R2=0.128 
F(8,93)=14.031 F(8,93)=1.247 F(8,93)=1.96 
p=.000  p=.281 p=.006 Firm Performance 
R2=0.547 R2=0.311 R2=0.144 
F(7,100)=12.71 F(7,100)=2.334 F(7,100)=1.545 
p=.000  p=.03 p=.161 CEO Power 
R2=0.471 R2=0.14 R2=0.098 
 
Table 1 results were based on the linear regression testing. It showed that there was 
a relationship between the CEO Salary, the Firm Size, and the CEO Power. It 
showed that there is a relationship between the CEO Bonus and the CEO Power; 
however, there was no relationships found between the CEO Bonus, the Firm Size, 
and the Firm Performance. In addition, it showed that there is relationship between 
the CEO Total Compensation and the Firm Size yet there was no relationship found 
between the CEO Total Compensation, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power. 
Thus, it concluded that the CEO Bonus model is not influenced by the sub-variables 
of the Firm Size – the Total Sales and the Total Employees; it concluded that the 
CEO Bonus model was not influenced by the sub-variables of the Firm Performance 
– the Return on Assets, the Return on Equity, the Earnings Per Share, the Cash Flow 
per Share, the Common Stock Outstanding, the Book Value of Common Stock, and 
the Market Value of Common Stock; and it concluded that the CEO Total 
Compensation model is not influenced by the sub-variables of the CEO Power – the 
CEO Age, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the CEO Share Values, the CEO Tenure, 
the CEO Turnover, the 5 percent Management Ownership, and the 5 percent 
Individuals/Institutions Ownership. 
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4.2 CEO Compensation and Firm Size 
 
Table 2: Correlations (CEO Compensation vs. Firm Size) 
 
 Salary Bonus Total Compensation 
Total Sales 0.688 -0.002 0.25 
Total Employees 0.423 0.015 0.356 
 
Table 2 illustrated the correlation results between the three categories of the CEO 
Compensation and the Firm Size. It showed that: there was a strong correlation 
existed between the CEO Salary, the Total Sales, and the Total Employees; there 
was a weak correlation existed between the CEO Bonus, the Total Sales, and the 
Total Employees, and there is a moderate relationship between the Total 
Compensation, the Total Sales, and the Total Employees. Thus, it signifies that, 
since Canadian financial institutions are mostly large and strong, the impact to the 
CEO Salary was strongly positively correlated.  Interestingly, the Firm Size was not 
a factor in determining the CEO Bonus perhaps due to the importance of other 
factors such as organizational management and net profit margin. However, the 
Firm Size had a positive moderate relationship with the Total Compensation 
signifying that the non-cash compensation benefits had a moderate to good impact in 
determining the CEO compensation or the structure of the CEO compensation 
contract was designed more towards long-terms benefits.  
 
4.3 CEO Compensation and Firm Performance 
 
Table 3: Correlations (CEO Compensation vs. Firm Performance) 
 
 Salary Bonus Total Compensation 
Return on Assets  0.011 0.151 -0.076 
Return on Equity 0.168 0.252 0.093 
Earnings Per Share -0.1 -0.079 -0.023 
Cash Flow Per Share 0.06 0.054 0.044 
Net Profit Margin 0.686 0.116 0.298 
Common Stock Outstanding 0.506 0.014 0.183 
Book Value of Common Stock 0.603 0.06 0.309 
Market Value of Common Stock 0.658 0.11 0.246 
 
Table 3 results illustrated that the correlation between the three categories of the 
CEO Compensation and the Firm Performance. It showed that there was a weak 
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positive correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO Bonus, the CEO 
Total Compensation, the Return on Assets (ROA), the Return on Equity (ROE), and 
the Cash Flow Per Share (CFPS). Thus, it signifies that in the large Canadian 
financial institutions, among the balance sheets involved items such as ROA, ROE, 
and CFPS, the influence to any component of the CEO Compensation was 
characterized as weak positive, perhaps due to the CEO Compensation contract 
gives less importance to assets and related returns. On the other hand, there was a 
weak negative correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO Bonus, the 
CEO Total Compensation, and the Earnings Per Share (EPS). Thus, it signifies that 
the shareholders earnings per share had nil to negative impact on the CEO 
Compensation. It was found that there was a strong correlation between the CEO 
Salary, the Net Profit Margin (NPM), the Common Shares Outstanding (CSO), the 
Book Value of Common Shares Outstanding (BVCSO), and the Market Value of 
Common Shares (MVCS). Thus, it signifies that the accounting net income is one of 
the major determinants of the CEO Salary. In addition, the Common Shares 
outstanding surprisingly found to be highly correlated with the CEO Salary this may 
perhaps related to the influence of additional shares issues to the employees 
especially to the management. In addition, the value of common shares both at cost 
and market were also found to be highly correlated with CEO Salary signifying the 
effect of strong earnings and positive market reactions.  
 
4.4  CEO Compensation and CEO Power 
 
Table 4: Correlations (CEO Compensation vs. CEO Power) 
 
  Salary Bonus Total Compensation 
CEO Age 0.038 0.007 0.014 
CEO Shares Outstanding -0.185 0.007 -0.101 
CEO Share Value -0.143 0.007 -0.081 
CEO Tenure -0.165 -0.232 -0.203 
CEO Turnover -0.081 0.048 -0.052 
MGMT. 5% Ownership 0.255 -0.13 -0.098 
INDV./INST. 5% Ownership -0.227 0.074 -0.14 
 
The Table 4 results illustrated that the correlation between the three categories of the 
CEO Compensation and the CEO Power. It showed that there was a weak negative 
correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO Age, the CEO Shares 
Outstanding, the CEO Share Value, the CEO Tenure, the CEO Turnover, the 5 
percent Management Ownership, and the 5 percent Individuals/Institutions 
Ownership. Thus, it signifies that in the large Canadian financial institutions, these 
sub-variables of the CEO Power were a non-factor and in fact a negative impact in 
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the determinant of the CEO Salary, except the 5 percent Management Shares 
Ownership which had a moderate correlation of .255. The correlations between the 
CEO Bonus, the CEO Age, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the CEO Share Value, the 
CEO Turnover, and the 5 percent Individuals/Institutions Ownership found to be 
weakly positive, except to the CEO Tenure and the 5 percent Management 
Ownership. Thus, it signifies that the sub-variables of the CEO Power had a weak 
influence on the bonus determination by the board. The one reason was perhaps due 
to Canadian financial institutions equity ownership and share price changes were 
insignificant, at least from the period 2005 to 2010. The other reason perhaps, the 
global credit crunch period from 2007 to 2009, although had a minimum impact on 
the strong Canadian financial institutions, yet may have some degree of impact 
towards this statistical results in a negative fashion. The correlations between the 
CEO Total Compensation, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the CEO Share Value, the 
CEO Tenure, the CEO Turnover, the 5 percent Management Ownership, and the 5 
percent Individuals/Institutions Ownership found to be weakly negative, except to 
the CEO Age weak positive ratio. Thus, it signifies that the CEO Total 
Compensation which includes the non-cash components, found to have nil to 
negative influence by the sub-variables of the CEO Power. More importantly, 
overall, the CEO Power had no influence on the CEO Compensation, this is perhaps 
true in light of the ownership structure in the Canadian financial institutions, that is, 
the Canadian financial institutions shares are mostly owned (less than 5 percent) by 
the individuals or institutions. In addition, the Canadian financial institutions 
securities laws such as: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act; 
Bank Act; Trust and Loan Companies Act; Cooperative Credit Associations Act; 
and Insurance Companies Act, prohibited any form of the management ownership, 
or prohibited any individuals or institutions owning significant ownership to create 




Overall, there was a relationship between the CEO Salary, the Firm Size, the Firm 
Performance and the CEO Power; there is a relationship between the CEO Bonus, 
the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power; there was a relationship between the 
CEO Total Compensation, the Firm Size, and the Firm Performance. However, there 
was no relationship found: between the CEO Bonus, the Firm Size, and the Firm 
 
3 Further Study: Although this study of the Canadian Financial Institutions CEO Compensation System 
was comprehensive in nature by attesting the CEO Compensation with relevant variables such as the 
Firm Size, the Firm Performance, and the CEO Power, however, qualitative areas such as the effect of 
the board composition to the CEO Compensation in the Canadian Financial Institutions; the effect of 
the non-monopolized ownership structure in the Canadian Financial Institutions on the CEO 
Compensation, and the effect of the Canadian government regulations on financial institutions on CEO 
Compensation, all would greatly assist in understanding the additional dynamics of the Canadian 
Financial Institutions CEO Compensation system. 
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Performance; and between the CEO Total Compensation and the CEO Power. The 
correlation between the CEO Salary, the Total Sales, and the Total Employees was 
strong, however, the correlation between the CEO Bonus, the Total Sales, and the 
Total Employees was weak, and however, the correlation between the CEO Total 
Compensation, the Total Sales, and the Total Employees was moderate. 
 
There was a weak positive correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO 
Bonus, the CEO Total Compensation, the Return on Assets (ROA), the Return on 
Equity (ROE), and the Cash Flow Per Share (CFPS). However, there was a weak 
negative correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO Bonus, the CEO 
Total Compensation, and the Earnings Per Share (EPS). However, there was a 
strong correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the Net Profit Margin (NPM), 
the Common Shares Outstanding (CSO), the Book Value of Common Shares 
Outstanding (BVCSO), and the Market Value of Common Shares (MVCS). 
However, there is a weak to moderate positive relationship between the CEO Bonus, 
the CEO Total Compensation, the NPM, the CSO, the BVCSO, and the MVCSO. 
 
There was a weak negative correlation existed between the CEO Salary, the CEO 
Age, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the CEO Share Value, the CEO Tenure, the CEO 
Turnover, the 5 percent Management Ownership, and the 5 percent 
Individuals/Institutions Ownership. The correlations between the CEO Bonus, the 
CEO Age, the CEO Shares Outstanding, the CEO Share Value, the CEO Turnover, 
and the 5 percent Individuals/Institutions Ownership found to be weakly positive, 
except to the CEO Tenure and the 5 percent Management Ownership. The 
correlations between the CEO Total Compensation, the CEO Shares Outstanding, 
the CEO Share Value, the CEO Tenure, the CEO Turnover, the 5 percent 
Management Ownership, and the 5 percent Individuals/Institutions Ownership found 
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